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1 
BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. – THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT THE 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT 
TRUMPS THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Sue Ganske* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 
As noted by the Tenth Circuit, the issue presented in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.2 involves a “tale of two statutes.”3  The first statute is the 
Religious Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).4  The RFRA prohibits 
government action that substantially burdens a person’s exercise of 
religion.5  The second statute is the recently enacted Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), which made numerous changes to the health 
care system.6  The ACA requires health insurers to provide coverage for 
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 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  When the Hobby Lobby case reached the Supreme Court, 
the Court found it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claims raised by Conestoga 
Wood Specialties and the Hahns.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2785 (2014). 
 2. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751. 
 3. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, 
J. concurring), aff’d sub nom. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 4. Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.); see infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3) (2012). 
 6. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (codified in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.). 
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additional preventive care and screenings as provided by general guidelines 
endorsed by the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”).7 
Under the ACA, the HRSA commissioned the Institute of Medicine to 
develop recommendations for the HSRA guidelines.8  These included 
recommendations that all insurance plans cover all Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approved methods of contraception, sterilization, 
patient education, and counseling for all women.9  The approved methods of 
contraception included, but are not limited to: diaphragms, oral 
contraceptives, emergency contraceptives, and intrauterine devices.10  
HRSA adopted these recommendations in full,11 and used these guidelines 
when publishing their final rules.12 
According to the ACA, large employers with fifty or more full-time 
employees13 may provide employees with health insurance,14 or pay a 
penalty.15  Employers with fewer than fifty employees are not required to 
provide health insurance coverage under the ACA.16  As of August 1, 2012, 
unless exempted or grandfathered, all employers’ group health plans were 
required to conform to the published rules.17  Grandfathered health insurance 
 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012).  Other issues of the ACA have previously been 
litigated.  In 2012, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2608 (2012), the Court held five to four that the individual mandate, 26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(a) (2012), was constitutional as a tax, but not under the Commerce Clause.  See 
Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 34-40 (2013) (discussing the government’s tax argument and 
the plurality opinion in Sebelius); see generally Comment, National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 72 (2012). 
 8. The Institute of Medicine is an independent non-profit “health arm of the 
National Academy of Sciences.”  About the IOM, INST. OF MED., 
http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last updated Nov. 04, 2013, 10:09 PM). 
 9. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS, 
165 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13181. 
 10. OFFICE OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. FOOD. & DRUG ADMIN., Birth Control Guide, 
http://www.fda.gove/downloads/ForConsumers/ByAudience/For%E2%80A8Women/Fre
ePublications/UCM356451.pdf (last visited Dec. 02, 2014). 
 11. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,870 (July 02, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156). 
 12. Id.; see 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (codifying the final rule). 
 13. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012) (defining “applicable large employer”). 
 14. Id. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A); see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751, 2762-64 (2014) (discussing the ACA requirements). 
 15. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D(a)-(b), 4980H(a) (2012). 
 16. See id. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A). 
 17. Coverage for Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 39,870; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Women’s Preventive 
Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands 
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plans are not subject to the preventative services provision.18  Additionally, 
certain religious organizations and religious non-profits are exempt from the 
requirement to provide contraceptive services.19 
Three for-profit closely held corporations filed two separate suits claiming 
that the requirement to cover four of the mandatory twenty contraceptive 
methods violated the RFRA.20  These three for-profit corporations objected, 
for religious reasons, to the requirement stating the corporations had to cover 
four of the currently required twenty contraceptive methods.21  The 
corporations objected because the four methods could prevent the 
implantation of a fertilized egg.22  These for-profit closely held corporations 
employ more than fifty people, are not grandfathered, and are not religious 
non-profits, so they did not qualify for any exemption from coverage.23  In 
light of an appellate court split,24 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to decide whether or not the regulations25 regarding contraception violated 
the RFRA.26  On June 30, 2014, in a five to four decision27 the Supreme 
 
Prevention Coverage for Women’s Health and Well-Being, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. 
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Dec. 02, 2014). 
 18. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 44,621, 46,623 (Aug. 03, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).  A grandfathered 
plan is defined as a plan that was in existence on March 23, 2010, and has not undergone 
any enumerated changes that would disqualify the plan, such as “elimination of all or 
substantially all benefits to diagnose or treat a particular condition.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 2590.715-1251T(a)(1)(i) (2013); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-1211T (2013); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.140(a). 
 19. 145 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A)-(B) (2013); Group Health Plans and Health 
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623-24. 
 20. Hobby Lobby Stores and Mardel Christian bookstores were among the plaintiffs 
in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d 
and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation was the 
plaintiff in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Pa. 
2013), aff’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec. of United States Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 21. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2765-66. 
 22. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124-25; Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 390. 
 23. Supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
 24. In Hobby Lobby, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a denial of a 
preliminary injunction.  723 F.3d at 1147.  In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a 
preliminary injunction.  724 F.3d 377 at 417; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354) (2014) (discussing circuit split). 
 25. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2013). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012). 
 27. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2758 (2014). 
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Court held that indeed the requirement to cover the four disputed methods 
violated the RFRA.28 
This article examines the Supreme Court’s ruling in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.29 and discusses its implications.  The Supreme Court’s 
ruling is limited, and confined only to closely-held non-profit corporations 
that object to the contraceptive mandate, or part of the mandate, for religious 
reasons.30  However, it is possible or even probable that the decision has 
opened the door to further litigation on this issue for other employers to 
request exemptions under the ACA to follow.  Further litigation under the 
ACA is pending31, and is also discussed. 
The ACA was a controversial piece of legislation from the very start.  
Politicians and commentators alike challenged the individual mandate,32 
contraception coverage,33 and the establishment of administrative bodies to 
administer the law,34 among other provisions.  On June 28, 2012, the 
Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutionality of one piece of the ACA 
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.35 
I. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS AND 
THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
A. ACA Provision 
Under the individual mandate, most Americans were required to purchase 
“minimum essential” health insurance or pay a tax penalty.36  Specifically, 
the law required that “[a]n applicable individual shall for each month 
beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the 
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum 
 
 28. Id. at 2785. 
 29. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 30. Id. at 2785. 
 31. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-114, 2014 
WL 3817533 (U.S. Nov. 07, 2014). 
 32. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 
(N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 33. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), 
rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 34. Coons v. Geithner, No. CV–10–1714–PHX–GMS, 2012 WL 6674394 (Dec. 20, 
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 35. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 36. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012). 
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essential coverage for such month.”37  Individuals would be in compliance 
with the individual mandate if they were part of a qualifying federal health 
care program, had an “employer-sponsored plan,” were participants in a plan 
that was “grandfathered” in or, most notably, purchased a “plan offered in 
the individual market.”38 
B. The Decisions Below 
On March 23, 2010, the day President Obama signed the ACA into law, 
the National Federation of Independent Business, twenty-six states, and two 
private individuals challenging the ACA’s individual mandate.39  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the ACA attempted to regulate individuals who were 
not active in the health care marketplace and, therefore, outside the reach of 
the Commerce Clause.40 
The District Court held that enacting the individual mandate was not a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.41  
The District Court reasoned that “activity” was an essential element to any 
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause and Congress’ attempt to 
compel participation in the marketplace was outside the scope of that 
Clause.42  The District Court further rejected the government’s claim that a 
failure to purchase insurance was itself “activity” because of the unique 
nature of the health care marketplace and the profound effect uninsured 
individuals have on that marketplace.43  Thus, the District Court concluded 
that the individual mandate was unconstitutional.44 
 
 37. Id.; see id. § 5000A(d)(1) (defining “applicable individual” as anyone who was 
not incarcerated, present unlawfully, covered under a “health care sharing ministry.”). 
 38. Id. § 5000A(f).  Under the ACA, individuals who (a) could not afford coverage, 
(b) were experiencing hardship, or (c) were members of an Indian tribe were exempt 
from the individual mandate.  Id. § 5000A (e). 
 39. Complaint at 1, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 
2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.) (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012). 
 40. Florida, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 at 1270; see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
559 (1995) (“Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”). 
 41. Florida, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. 
 42. Id. at 1286 (rejecting the “power to compel an otherwise passive individual into a 
commercial transaction with a third party merely by asserting—as was done in the Act—
that compelling the actual transaction is itself ‘commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce.’”) (emphasis in original). 
 43. See generally id. at 1288-95. 
 44. Id. at 1305-06.  The District Court also addressed the plaintiffs’ other claim that 
the Medicaid expansion was compulsory and, therefore, unconstitutional because the 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the 
District Court that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause 
when it enacted the individual mandate.45  Notably, the Eleventh Circuit 
declined to base its Commerce Clause discussion on whether individuals 
were active or inactive in the marketplace.46  Instead, the Eleventh Circuit 
conducted a multifactor analysis in deference to the unique nature of the 
individual mandate question.47  In the end, the Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that upholding the mandate under the Commerce Clause would 
unconstitutionally expand Congress’ power because doing so would mean 
that “the mere fact of an individual’s existence substantially affects interstate 
commerce” and, thus, brings that individual under the power of the 
Commerce Clause.48 
The Eleventh Circuit also “remain[ed] unpersuaded” by the government’s 
alternative argument that the individual mandate was properly enacted under 
Congress’ power to tax because the individual mandate to be a mandate with 
a penalty rather than a tax.49  Rejecting the government’s argument that the 
mandates revenue-producing element should qualify it as a tax, the Eleventh 
Circuit noted that the requirement is repeatedly described as a “mandate” in 
the legislation itself and that Congress did not intend for the mandate to 
function as a tax.50 
 
states would either be required to accept the “transformed Medicaid program with its new 
costs and obligations” or withdraw from the program and lose all federal funds.  Id. at 
1267.  The District Court noted that participation in the program was entirely voluntary 
and, as the states’ claim that they would have to accept changes to a voluntary program 
did not prove the ACA’s unconstitutionality, the District Court granted the government’s 
motion for summary judgment on that count.  Id. at 1270 (noting that several states 
appeared amici to defend the ACA’s program). 
 45. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1282 (11th Cir. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012); id. at 1244-48 (reviewing congressional findings related to the size and 
cost of the health care marketplace). 
 46. Id. at 1286; id. at 1286-87 (also rejecting an economic/noneconomic distinction). 
 47. Id. at 1295 (describing the scope of the individual mandate as “breathtaking”). 
 48. Id.; see id. at 1295-97 (dismissing the government’s argument that the unique 
nature of the individual mandate serves to limit the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling and, 
therefore, the reach of the Commerce Clause), 1305 (noting that health insurance has 
traditionally been an area of state concern); see also id. at 1267 (agreeing with the 
District Court that the Medicaid expansion was “not unduly coercive”). 
 49. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1314-15 (noting that lower courts overwhelmingly reject the 
government’s tax-based argument), 1317-18 (rejecting the government’s argument that 
the mandate qualifies a tax because the penalty would be collected by the Internal 
Revenue Service). 
 50. Id. at 1314-15; see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (2012) (“If a taxpayer who is 
an applicable individual, or an applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is liable 
under paragraph (3), fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months 
2015] Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 7 
C. The Supreme Court Upholds the Individual Mandate51 
The Supreme Court also rejected the government’s argument that 
Congress had the right to enforce the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause but ultimately held that the mandate was constitutional as 
a tax.52  In dismissing the Commerce Clause claim, the Court noted that 
many individuals do not currently own or plan on purchasing health 
insurance and that enforcing the mandate under that clause would effectively 
force inactive consumers into the marketplace in order to regulate them.53  
The Court also worried that recognizing Congress’ power to enact the 
mandate under the Commerce Clause would lead to an unlimited Commerce 
Clause power.54 
After rejecting the government’s Commerce Clause argument, the Court 
carefully evaluated the government’s alternative tax argument.  “Granting 
the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes,”55 the Court 
held that the federal government could enact the mandate under the Taxing 
and Spending Clause because reading the statute as imposing a tax was 
“reasonable.”56  The Court specifically noted that a tax is the only penalty 
for declining to buy health insurance.57  The Court further noted that the 
mandate was “plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage” but 
reasoned that the government was well within its rights to enact a tax that 
influenced the conduct of individual consumers.58 
 
. . . there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures . . . .) 
(emphasis added). 
 51. The Court also addressed the Medicaid expansion, striking down that portion of 
the ACA because it unconstitutionally coerced states into expanding their Medicaid 
programs.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012); see id. at 
2602 (noting that Congress can “create incentives for States to act in accordance with 
federal policies” but may not compel their cooperation).  But see id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (asserting that the Medicaid expansion was constitutional and not coercive 
where the federal government agreed to provide funds and would not withhold other 
federal funds for states that declined to participate). 
 52. Id. at 2591, 2600. 
 53. Id. at 2587. 
 54. Id. at 2589.  The Court also rejected the government’s argument that the Mandate 
was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Id. at 2592-93.  While the 
Court deferred to Congress’ use of “convenient” or “useful” measures to further its 
enumerated powers, it rejected the government’s invocation of that Clause as it related to 
the individual mandate because it would otherwise grant Congress the right to “reach 
beyond the natural limit of its authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who 
otherwise would be outside of it.”  Id. at 2592. 
 55. Id. at 2594. 
 56. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 57. Id. at 2593-94. 
 58. Id. at 2596; see id. at 2600 (noting that the mandate qualifies as a tax under the 
Court’s “narrowest interpretations of the taxing power”). 
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Joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg penned a concurring 
opinion that would have upheld the individual mandate under the Commerce 
Clause.59  Analogizing Congress’ health care overall to the Social Security 
System, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the states were unable to control the 
rising costs of insurance and only Congress could act at a national level to 
address the burden health care placed on the economy.60  Justice Ginsburg 
also reasoned that “Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the 
uninsured, as a class, substantially affect interstate commerce” and, thus, the 
power to act under the Commerce Clause.61  Justice Ginsburg also rejected 
the majority’s suggestion that the mandate encompasses non-consumers that 
would ordinarily be outside Congress’ regulation under the Commerce 
Clause because everyone will, at some time, purchase insurance or otherwise 
participate in the health care marketplace.62 
Justices Scalia, Alito, Breyer, and Thomas dissented and asserted that 
Congress overreached its enumerated powers when it passed the ACA.63  
The dissenting justices explained that Congress’ effort to compel individuals 
to buy health insurance or pay a penalty went beyond regulating commerce 
to actually create commerce by forcing inactive individuals to join the 
marketplace.64  In the justices’ opinion, that mandate stretched far beyond 
Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause.65  The dissenting justices 
further rejected the Court’s decision to uphold the individual mandate as a 
tax and noted that, even if Congress may have had the power to impose a 
tax, it did not enact the mandate under that power.66  Instead, Congress 
imposed a mandate with a “penalty” under the Commerce Clause, a penalty 
that could not later be reframed as a “tax” to survive judicial scrutiny.67 
 
 59. Id. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 2612; id. at 2609-11 (discussing the size and complexity of the health care 
marketplace) 
 61. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2617 (noting that the “inability to pay for a significant 
portion of that consumption drives up market prices, foists costs on other consumers, and 
reduces market efficiency and stability”). 
 62. Id. at 2618; id. at 2621 (rejecting the requirement that an individual be active in 
the marketplace in order to fall under the Commerce Clause) (quoting Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942)). 
 63. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
 64. Id. at 2644 (“[W]hen Congress provides that (nearly) all citizens must buy an 
insurance contract . . . it directs the creation of commerce.”). 
 65. Id. at 2648 (“[Young people] are quite simply not participants in that market, and 
cannot be made so (and thereby subjected to regulation) by the simple device of defining 
participants to include all those who will, later in their lifetime, probably purchase the 
goods or services covered by the mandated insurance.”). 
 66. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2651. 
 67. Id. at 2653; id. at 2662 (further rejecting the Medicaid expansion because it 
requires full participation from the states and uses federal funds to compel that 
participation).  Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent to criticize the court’s use of the 
2015] Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 9 
D. Reaction to NFIB v. Sebelius 
The Court’s decision to uphold the individual mandate was largely 
heralded by those who consider the mandate as the cornerstone of the 
ACA,68 though the Court’s Commerce Clause and tax discussions drew 
sharp responses.69  Some noted with approval that the active/inactive 
distinction was “novel,”70 although observers who considered the new test 
“ultimately successful” were matched by those who rejected the Court’s 
categories.71  Legal observers declared outright that there “is little doubt that 
[Sebelius] marks a doctrinal turn that can restrain congressional power” and 
future efforts by Congress to regulate the marketplace may be stymied by 
the Court’s new analytical framework.72  Others complained that Court did 
not appreciate the breadth and pervasiveness of the health care market in 
rejecting Congress’ attempts to regulate insurance.73 
Commentators quickly seized on the Court’s tax discussion as a departure 
from traditional jurisprudence and others suggested that “Congress’s Taxing 
Power has been extended to historical new bounds.”74  While some 
embraced the expansive view of the Taxing Clause, other commentators 
questioned the wisdom of “taxing inactivity” and worried that the Court had 
 
“substantial effects” test to consider arguments related to the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 
2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
 68. There was some suggestion at the time that Chief Justice Roberts decided to 
uphold the mandate under the Taxing and Spending Clause to rehabilitate the Court’s 
image after it was repeatedly characterized as partisan and political.  Stephen M. 
Feldman, Chief Justice Roberts’s Marbury Moment: The Affordable Care Act Case 
(NFIB v Sebelius), 13 WYO. L. REV. 335, 348 (2013) (“By unexpectedly reaching this 
ostensibly liberal result-upholding the ACA-Roberts will likely shield the Court from 
intense political scrutiny and criticism for the near future.”). 
 69. Though it will not be discussed here, the Court’s rejection of the Medicare 
expansion created similarly powerful reactions.  See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Coercion, 
Conditions, and Commandeering: A Brief Note on the Medicaid Holding of NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 84 (2014) (describing the Court’s Medicaid 
decision as “incoherent”). 
 70. Matthew J. Lindsay, Federalism and Phantom Economic Rights in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 687, 702 (2014). 
 71. Lindsay, supra note 70, at 702. 
 72. Feldman, supra note 68, at 343. 
 73. Lindsay, supra note 70, at 701 (“Whether one defines the relevant market 
broadly, as the consumption of health care; somewhat more narrowly, as the financing of 
health care; or still more discretely, as health care insurance, each affects interstate 
commerce in a proximate and palpable way.”). 
 74. Christopher L. Richard, Balancing Liberty and Healthcare Access: Sebelius on 
Taxing Inactivity; 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 141, 152 (2013); see also id. at 151 
(describing the ACA as “gutted to some extent” by the Court’s decision); Lindsay, supra 
note 70, at 689 (noting that “few predicted” that the Court’s decision would turn on 
Congress’ power to tax). 
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granted Congress unlimited taxing power.75  Specifically, scholars described 
the Court’s decision as helping Congress circumvent its enumerated powers 
and “resort[ing] to the taxing power to achieve what it could not achieve by 
other means.”76  Still others challenged the wisdom of approving legislation 
under the Taxing Clause when that was not how Congress originally 
characterized the mandate.77  While the Court distinguished the mandate as a 
tax rather than a penalty, commentators worried that the decision gave little 
guidance on where the line should be drawn.78 
II. BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. AND CONTRACEPTION 
COVERAGE 
A.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the ACA 
“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion.”79 
In Employment Division v. Smith,80 the Supreme Court held that facially 
neutral laws that in effect incidentally burdened free religious practice do not 
contravene the Free Exercise Clause.81  In response, Congress enacted the 
RFRA “[i]n order to ensure broad protection for religious liberty.”82  The 
government cannot substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even 
when the burden is caused by a generally applicable rule.83  If the 
government does substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, that 
person is exempt from the law unless the government can demonstrate that 
 
 75. Richard, supra note 74, at 153; Matthew A. Melone, The Pundits Doth Protest 
Too Much: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and the Future of 
the Taxing Power, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189, 1208 (2012) (describing the individual 
mandate as a tax “imposed for merely existing”). 
 76. Melone, supra note 75, at 1210 (suggesting, however, that there remain some 
meaningful limitations on the taxing power). 
 77. Brett W. Hastings, Taxation Without Limitation: The Prohibited Pretext Doctrine 
v. the Sebelius Theory, 15 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 229, 240 (2013) (arguing that 
Sebelius “grants Congress the ability to simply ignore violations of constitutional 
provisions so long as the associated law can reasonably be interpreted as a tax”). 
 78. Melone, supra note 75, at 1205. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012);  see also id. at § 2000bb-1(b); Scott W. 
Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate, 91 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 589, 605-06 (2014); Jeremy M. Christiansen, Note, The Word “Person” Includes 
Corporations: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Protects both For and 
Nonprofit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 623, 623 (2013). 
 80. 494 U.S. 872, 874-76 (1990) (altering the test for free exercise of religion claims 
used in prior Supreme Court precedent). 
 81. Id. at 882-90. 
 82. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). 
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the application of the burden to that person is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest, and that it is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.84 
Under the ACA, “[a] group health plan and a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum 
provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements 
for85 . . . with respect to women, such additional preventive care and 
screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the 
Health Resources and Services Administration.”86  Any employer with 50 or 
more full-time employees must offer a health insurance plan that provides 
minimum essential coverage or be fined $100 per day for each employee 
who qualifies as an affected “individual.”87 
B.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius 
David Green, founder of Hobby Lobby, Inc. and his wife Barbara, and 
their three children, Steve Green, President of Hobby Lobby, Inc. Mart 
Green, founder and CEO of Mardel, and Darsee (Green) Lett filed suit on 
behalf of the corporations and in their individual capacity.88  The Greens run 
both businesses through a management trust which requires trustees to sign a 
statement of faith and to maintain a walk with the Lord Jesus Christ.89  Each 
Green is a trustee.90  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., an S Corporation,91 has over 
500 arts and crafts stores with about 13,000 full-time employees.92  Mardel, 
Inc. is a Christian bookstore and educational supply store with thirty-five 
stores in seven states with about 400 employees.93 
The Greens are Christian, and operate their companies in accordance with 
their faith.94  Both companies are not open on Sunday in accordance with 
their Christian faith.95  Hobby Lobby, Inc. purchases full-page newspaper 
 
 84. Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a). 
 86. Id. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 87. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D(a)-(b) (2012). 
 88. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1122 (10th Cir.), aff’d sub 
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  According to the Internal Revenue Service, “S corporations are corporations 
that elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to their 
shareholders for federal tax purposes.”  IRS, S Corporations 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/S-Corporations (last 
updated Nov. 12, 2014); see 26 U.S.C. § 1361. 
 92. Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1122. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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ads welcoming others to “know Jesus as their Lord and Savior,” and does 
not engage in business activities that encourage alcohol use.96  The Greens 
provide health insurance to the employees of the two companies, however 
because of their Christian faith they believe that life begins at conception,97 
they cannot provide coverage for drugs and devices they believe cause 
abortions.  Furthermore, their insurance historically never covered 
contraceptive drugs and devices that could terminate a pregnancy.98  The 
government did not dispute the sincerity of their beliefs.99 
The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius100 challenged the 
regulations that required employers to cover four of the twenty FDA 
approved methods of birth control,101 because those four could prevent a 
fertilized egg from implanting.102  FDA approved methods of birth control 
not found objectionable to the plaintiffs include the barrier method of a 
female condom, a diaphragm with spermicide, a sponge with spermicide, a 
cervical cap with spermicide, spermicide alone, oral contraceptives 
including a combined pill, a progestin only pill, an extended/continuous use 
pill, a patch, a vaginal contraceptive ring, and a progestin implant.103  
Methods deemed objectionable include emergency contraception including 
Plan B, a pill that blocks the hormone progesterone, and intrauterine devices 
(IUDs) that prevent sperm from reaching a fertilized egg.104  According to 
the FDA, emergency contraception with the hormone progestin works 
 
 96. Id.. 
 97. Id. at 1122, 1125. 
 98. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  But see Complaint at 14, Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. CIV–12–1000–HE) 
(acknowledging that their insurances policies covered two of the challenged drugs prior 
to the passage of the ACA and that plaintiffs excluded those drugs once they reexamined 
their policies and became aware of the coverage for the first time). 
 99. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125. 
 100. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), 
rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 101. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123, 1124-25.  The plaintiffs only objected to four of 
the twenty methods: two intrauterine devices, Plan B (a morning after pill), and Ella (a 
week after pill).  Id. at 1123.  According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he government does 
not articulate why accommodating such a limited request fundamentally frustrates its 
goals.”  Id. at 1144. 
 102. Id. at 1124-25. 
 103. Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.ht
m (last updated Aug. 27, 2013); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123. 
 104. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123; see Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/ 
freepublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated Aug. 27, 2013). 
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mainly by stopping the release of an egg, but may also prevent fertilization 
of the egg or implantation of the fertilized egg.105  The Plan B pill that stops 
the hormone progesterone works mainly by stopping or slowing the release 
of an egg but may also change the lining of the womb, which prevents 
implantation of a fertilized egg.106  The IUD works by preventing the sperm 
from reaching or fertilizing the egg, but may also prevent a fertilized egg 
from attaching to the uterus.107 
Since they are for-profit, Hobby Lobby and Mardel do not fall into any of 
the exceptions, for less than fifty employees,108 for a grandfathered plan,109 
or for a religious employer.110  Hobby Lobby stood to be fined $1.3 million 
per day for failure to provide the four forms of preventative care they 
objected to.111  Anticipating potential significant financial loss, the Greens 
filed suit and sought a preliminary injunction on the grounds that their First 
Amendment rights and rights under RFRA were violated.112 
The District Court held that the corporations lack free exercise rights and 
the plaintiffs were unlikely to establish a constitutional violation.113  The 
 
 105. Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.ht
m (last updated Aug. 27, 2013). 
 106. Id.; see NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Levonorgestrel, MEDLINEPLUS, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a610021.html (last updated Oct. 01, 
2010) (stating that levonorgestrel may change the lining of the uterus). 
 107. Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.ht
m (last updated Aug. 27, 2013). 
 108. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2013), 
aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 109. Supra note 18 and accompanying text.  Prior to the enactment of the mandate, 
Hobby Lobby did cover emergency contraceptives, but upon discovery of this, Hobby 
Lobby excluded those drugs.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 
1278, 1286 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), 
aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Complaint at 
14, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. CIV-12-
1000-HE).  The district court stated that this was only a mistake by Hobby Lobby, and 
the government does not dispute that Hobby Lobby has excluded emergency 
contraceptives.  Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.  Thus, Hobby Lobby argued that 
it was only asking to preserve the status quo, although they did not fall under the 
grandfathering clause.  Id.  Hobby Lobby is self-insured and elected not to maintain their 
grandfathered status before the contraceptive requirement was proposed.  Hobby Lobby, 
723 F.3d at 1124. 
 110. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. 
 111. The fine is $100 per day for each person not covered.  26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) 
(2012).  With 13,000 individuals insured, both men and women, Hobby Lobby would 
have faced nearly $475 million per year in fines.  Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125. 
 112. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. at 1283, 1285. 
 113. Id. at 1288. 
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Court reasoned that while corporations have some constitutional rights, such 
as free speech rights, individual and corporate constitutional rights are not 
identical.114  Additionally, the District Court further denied the motion for a 
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate 
a probability of success on their RFRA claim, despite RFRA not defining the 
term “person.”115  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied a motion for an injunction pending appeal.116 
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the 
denial of the preliminary injunction, holding that Hobby Lobby and Mardel 
were entitled to bring RFRA claims, as they “established a likelihood of 
success that their rights under this statute [were] substantially burdened by 
the contraceptive-coverage requirement, and have established an irreparable 
harm.”117  While the Court of Appeals unanimously held that Hobby Lobby 
and Mardel had standing to sue,118 the court fractured on other issues.119  A 
majority of five of the eight circuit judges reversed the district court’s ruling 
that Hobby Lobby and Mardel did not demonstrate a likelihood of success 
on their RFRA claim, and held that Hobby Lobby satisfied the first prong of 
the preliminary injunction test, and remanded on the other two prongs.120  A 
plurality of four, however, would have also held that the other prongs, the 
balance of equities and the public interest, were also satisfied.121 
 
 114. See id.; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 
(2010) (“The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical 
distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political 
speech.”). 
 115. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. at 1291, 1296-97. 
 116. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 120-6294, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 
26741 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (order denying preliminary injunction), aff’d 133 S. Ct. 
641 (2012). 
 117. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013), 
aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 118. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1121 (“[T]hree judges would . . . hold that the Greens 
have standing to bring to RFRA and Free Exercise claims and that a preliminary 
injunction should be granted on their RFRA claim … [but] would also find that the Anti-
Injunction Act is not jurisdictional and that the government has forfeited reliance.”).  The 
Court’s disposition consisted of six additional concurring and dissenting opinions.  Id. at 
1116, 1121 n.1. 
 119. Id. at 1128. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  The appeals court remanded to the district court to decide the other two 
factors determining whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction.  Id.at 1121.  The 
Court of Appeals concluded that both Hobby Lobby and Mardel had standing because 
they faced an imminent financial loss due to the mandate.  Id. at 1126.  On remand on 
July 19, 2013, the District Court granted the preliminary injunction.  Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. CIV-12-1000-HE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107248, at *5 
(W.D. Okla. July 19, 2013). 
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The appellate court decided, on the merits, whether the closely held, for 
profit, corporations were persons under the RFRA.122  Since the RFRA does 
not define “person,” the Dictionary Act states that in determining the 
meaning of any act of Congress, the word “person” includes individuals, 
corporations, companies, associations, and firms, among others.123  The 
appellate court was less concerned with this distinction between persons and 
corporations, and more concerned with whether the rights do not and should 
not turn on a tax status.124 
The court examined the question of whether a corporation’s First 
Amendment rights turn upon the tax code.125  Under the federal tax code, 
non-profit corporations organized and operated exclusively for purposes 
such as religion, charity, science, and education may qualify for tax 
exemptions.126  For-profit corporations may be closely held, such as the 
plaintiffs Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood Specialties, or 
publicly traded.127  The IRS defines closely held corporations as 
corporations that are not personal service corporations and in the last half of 
the year have had over 50% of their stock held by five or fewer 
individuals.128  According to the I.R.S. for-profit, publicly traded 
corporations, are made up of primarily stocks and are publically traded on 
one or more established securities markets in the United States or qualified 
foreign exchanges.129  So while the majority of the Supreme Court kept the 
 
 122. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1128. 
 123. Id. at 1129 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)); see generally, Alan J. Meese and Nathan 
B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit 
Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 275-77, 288 (2014); 
Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby Lobby in Constitutional Waters: Two Life Rings and an 
Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 67, 71-72 (2014); Case Note, Tenth Circuit Holds 
For-Profit Corporate Plaintiffs Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Substantial Burden on 
Religious Exercise Claim – Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1025, 1027 (2014); Jeremy Thomas Harbaugh, Case Note, Federal Appellate Court 
Holds that a For-Profit Corporation Can Challenge the Contraception Mandate Under 
the RFRA, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 692, 692-93, 694 n.31 (2013). 
 124. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135.  In his concurrence, Judge Hartz asserted that all 
corporations fall within First Amendment Free Exercise and RFRA protection.  Id. at 
1147 (Hartz, J., concurring); see generally, Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, 
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 41-43 (2014). 
 125. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1127-28, 1135. 
 126. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 127. Mary Pazanowski, For-Profits, Closely Held Corporations Can Opt Out of 
Contraceptive Mandates, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.bna.com/forprofit-closely-held-n17179891700/. 
 128. IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., Corporations, Pub. No. 542, 3 (Rev. Mar. 2012), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p542.pdf; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.883-2(d)(3) 
(2014). 
 129. 26 C.F.R. § 1.883-2(a) (2014). 
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ruling narrowly tailored to closely-held corporations, the Tenth Circuit 
stated in Conestoga Wood Specialties that the Internal Revenue Code should 
not be determinative.130  The focus, perhaps, should be on the religious 
beliefs and not the tax structure, and as a practical matter, it is harder to get a 
publicly-traded corporation to have a religious purpose.131 
C. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius 
The Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius132 case is similar to 
Hobby Lobby,133 except that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
unlike the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, upheld the denial of the 
preliminary injunction.134  The Hahn family, devout Mennonite 
Christians,135 own Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, a closely held 
for-profit corporation, which makes custom wood cabinet doors and 
components,136 and employ about 950 people.137  Conestoga makes 
charitable contributions according to their religious beliefs, and the 
corporation adheres to the Hahn Family Statement on the Sanctity of Human 
Life.138  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation’s health plan does not 
cover contraceptive prescriptions or drugs that can be used to abort a 
pregnancy.139 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation and its five owners moved for a 
preliminary injunction against the ACA regulation requiring employee 
health insurance coverage for the twenty approved contraceptives,140 
 
 130. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2760, 2764 (2014); Hobby 
Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135. 
 131. Ilya Somin, Can People “Exercise Religion” Through Publicly Traded 
Corporations?, WASH. POST (July 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/12/can-people-exercise-religion-through-publicly-traded-
corporations/. 
 132. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (2013), aff’d 
sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 133. See infra, section “Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v. Sebelius,” at 3-19, and 
accompanying endnotes, at 101-133. 
 134. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 135. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2764. 
 136. About, Our Story, CONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORP., 
http://www.conestogawood.com/about-conestoga/our-story (last visited Dec. 02, 2014). 
 137. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2764. 
 138. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03, 403 n.5. 
 139. Id. at 403. 
 140. Id. at 400-01. 
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specifically those four which could cause an abortion.141  In a case of first 
impression142 the plaintiffs challenged the ACA regulations on First 
Amendment143 and RFRA144 grounds.  Plaintiffs in Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. analogized their First Amendment Free Exercise claim to 
the First Amendment Free Speech claim, which the Supreme Court approved 
in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission.145  The District Court 
in Conestoga Wood Specialties, however, did not accept the plaintiffs’ 
analogy reasoning that the two provisions of the First Amendment, the Free 
Speech Clause and the Free Exercise of Religion Clause, differ.146  The 
District Court denied the motion for the preliminary injunction.147  The 
District Court stated that the Free Exercise Clause is for individual religious 
freedom, and corporations cannot avail themselves of this Constitutional 
provision.148  According to the District Court the Hahn’s first amendment 
claim also failed because the regulations are geared towards a legitimate 
governmental interest.149  The RFRA claim was similarly dismissed.150 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
decision holding that a for-profit corporation cannot engage in protected 
religious exercise, either under the First Amendment or the RFRA.151  The 
 
 141. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 390 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J. dissenting), rev’d and remanded 
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 142. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 400.  The district court stated that neither the 
Third Circuit nor the Supreme Court has decided whether a corporation has the religious 
rights of individuals.  Id. at 406. 
 143. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 144. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. 
 145. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 406.  Citizens United, a non-profit corporation 
received donations predominantly from individuals but also from some corporations. 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).  Citizens United 
brought declaratory and injunctive action against the Federal Elections Commission to 
ensure it did not run afoul of federal election laws.  Id. at 321.  The Supreme Court held 
that corporations have political free speech rights, and that the government may not 
suppress political speech because of the speaker’s corporate identity.  Id. at 365.  The 
Supreme Court thus held that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 
441b, was unconstitutional.  Id. 
 146. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. at 407 
 147. Id. at 419. 
 148. Id. at 408 (stating that the Free Exercise Clause is a personal right and not 
available to corporations). 
 149. Id. at 410. 
 150. Id. at 413. 
 151. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  The appeals court did not need to 
decide if a corporation is a person under the RFRA.  Id.; Zachary J. Phillipps, Note, Non-
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Court of Appeals addressed the application of the Supreme Court precedent 
of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.152  While the Free 
Exercise and Free Speech clauses are in close proximity in the First 
Amendment, they have historically been treated differently.153  The Appeals 
Court found that while there is free speech precedent to give corporations 
this right, there is an absence of case law giving corporations free exercise 
rights.154  Further, the court stated that the Hahn family members, in their 
individual capacity, were not likely to succeed on their First Amendment or 
RFRA claims.155  Thus, the denial of the preliminary injunction was 
affirmed.156  The Third Circuit noted the Tenth Circuit’s Hobby Lobby 
decision, but respectfully disagreed with the Tenth Circuit.157  The dissent 
observed the irony that the majority determined religious rights by the tax 
code, with non-profits having an exemption while for-profit corporations 
don’t have such rights.158  The circuit split set the issue up for a Supreme 
Court resolution on the issue. 
D.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.: The Supreme Court Addresses 
Contraception Coverage 
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby and reversed and 
remanded Conestoga Wood Specialties, Corp. to the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit.159  Justice Alito wrote for the majority and was joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.160  
According to the majority, the key issue was, whether HHS’s requirement 
for closely-held corporations to provide health insurance that includes 
contraceptives violates the RFRA and the owners’ sincere religious 
beliefs.161  The majority concluded that “a federal regulation’s restriction on 
 
Prophets: Why For-Profit, Secular Corporations Cannot Exercise Religion Within the 
Meaning of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. Rev. 39, 58-59 (2014). 
 152. See generally Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 383-86. 
 153. Id. at 386. 
 154. Id. at 384-85.  The Citizens United analogy did not appear at Supreme Court oral 
arguments or in the Supreme Court decision.  See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
 155. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 389. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 384 n.7. 
 158. Id. at 390. 
 159. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785. 
 160. Id. at 2758. 
 161. Id. at 2759. 
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the activities of a for-profit closely-held corporation must comply with the 
RFRA.”162 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority used the Dictionary Act to find a 
definition of “person” for the purpose of the RFRA.163  Under the Dictionary 
Act, the Court found the word “person” includes corporations, companies, 
firms, and other business associations.164  The Court observed that some 
lower court judges have suggested that the RFRA does not apply to for-
profit corporations, but the Court suggested this suggestion “flies in the face 
of modern corporate law.”165  The majority noted that corporations are 
human entities used to “achieve desired ends.”166 
Since the RFRA applied, the Court then determined that the regulation’s 
mandate to provide abortion-causing contraception substantially burdens the 
plaintiff’s exercise of religion.167  The Court pointed out in their opinion that 
the penalty per employee for failure to provide health insurance is expensive 
for the corporations.168  In an unusual move, the majority rebutted an 
argument not espoused by a party to the litigation but raised by Justice 
Sotomayor during oral argument.169  They addressed that the plaintiffs could 
pay the penalty and not provide the health insurance that has the offensive 
mandate.170  While the government did not make the argument below, 
Justice Sotomayor did raise the issue at oral argument.171  The majority 
found this argument “unpersuasive,” as the parties have religious reasons for 
not providing health insurance for their employees.172 
 
 162. Id. at 2775.  When deliberating whether a corporation fell within the RFRA’s 
definition of “persons,” the majority stated that “[a] corporation is simply a form of 
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”  Id. at 2768. 
 163. Id. at 2768-69; see 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person”). 
 164. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768-69. 
 165. Id. at 2756. 
 166. Id. at 2768. 
 167. Id. at 2759, 2775.  The Court observed that the Hahns and Greens religious 
beliefs about how life begins at conception are sincere.  Id. 
 168. Id. at 2770, 2776. 
 169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (Sotomayor, J.) (“But isn’t there another choice nobody talks about, which is 
paying the tax, which is a lot less than a penalty and a lot less than - - than the cost of 
health insurance at all?  These employers could choose not to give health insurance and 
pay not that high a penalty - - not that high a tax.”). 
 172. Id. at 23 (Sotomayor, J.) (“. . . [employers] can just pay a greater salary and let 
the employees go in on the exchange.”); Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2777 (agreeing with 
Justice Sotomayor, the majority stated that approach also costs more because group 
health insurance is generally more costly than individual insurance.).  In addition to 
raising wages to cover the cost of insurance for employees, the plaintiffs would have to 
pay the tax penalty for not providing health insurance.  Id. 
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Since the Court found that the contraceptive mandate relating to the four 
objectionable methods did place a substantial burden on the exercise of 
religion, the Court had to determine whether the mandate survived the test 
for strict scrutiny.173  The majority assumed that the interest in requiring 
cost-free employee access to the four methods of contraceptives in question 
was compelling.174  The Court, however, concluded that the contraceptive 
mandate regulations “fail the least-restrictive-means test.”175  The majority 
did not need to reach the First Amendment issues.176 
In Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he stated “freedom means that 
all persons have the right to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator 
and a divine law … It means, too, the right to express those beliefs … in the 
political, civic, and economic life of our larger community.”177  Justice 
Kennedy suggested that the mandate could be placed on the insurance 
company and not the employer.178 
However, Justice Ginsburg strongly dissented, calling the majority’s 
ruling a “decision of startling breadth.”179  Justice Ginsburg stated that the 
Court “holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with 
partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax 
laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.”180  
Justice Kennedy, in concurring, stated “the Court’s opinion does not have 
the breadth and sweep ascribed to it by the respectful and powerful 
dissent.”181  With respect to Justice Ginsburg, the plaintiffs were closely-
held for profit corporations, and the ruling may or may not extend to all 
commercial enterprises.182       
E.  Subsequent Contraception Coverage Litigation 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell,183 while 
narrowly tailored to cover only closely-held for-profit corporations with 
 
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014).  Under strict scrutiny, the government needed to prove the 
mandate furthered a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means 
for furthering that interest.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 174. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 175. Id. at 2782. 
 176. Id. at 2785. 
 177. Id. at 2785(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. at 2786. 
 179. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 182. Id. at 2760 (majority opinion) (noting the court’s holding does not extend to all 
commercial enterprise). C.f. id.at 2787 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (asserting the holding is, 
in fact, expansive enough to include commercial enterprise). 
 183. Id. at 2751. 
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sincerely held religious beliefs against the use of four FDA-approved 
contraceptives, is sure to spark additional litigation.  Shortly after the Hobby 
Lobby decision, Wheaton College, a religious non-profit, requested, and was 
granted, an injunction pending appeal from the Supreme Court.184  The 
Court decided whether an HHS required form must be completed to request 
an exemption from contraceptive coverage, or if written notice to the 
government, as Wheaton College used, suffices for exemption from 
contraceptive coverage.185  The Court’s order specifically stated that this is 
not an expression of the Court’s views on the merits.186  However, the 
dissent added their analysis concerning the injunction.  Justice Sotomayor, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, dissented from the injunction 
pending appeal.187  Justice Sotomayor stated that she strongly disagrees.188  
In addressing Wheaton College’s request for an injunction, Justice 
Sotomayor expressed concern over granting relief in relation to a recently 
enacted law and published regulations when lower courts had not 
adjudicated the merits of the challenge and such relief is “extraordinary and 
reserved for the rarest of cases.”189  The Justice seems to overlook that, these 
cases challenging aspects of the ACA and its implementing regulations are 
the rarest of cases, pitting Constitutional and statutory religious freedoms 
against statutory and regulatory health care mandates. 
Further, in Mersino Management Company v. Burwell,190 for example, the 
Court of Appeals for the Six Circuit granted an injunction against the ACA 
contraceptive mandate pending appeal.191  District courts have also granted 
preliminary injunctions against the enforcement of the contraceptive 
mandate after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby.192  Permanent 
 
 184. Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014). 
 185. Id. at 2807. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 2807-15 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) 
 188. Id. at 2810. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Order Granting an Injunction Pending Appeal, No. 13-1944 (6th Cir. July 9, 
2014). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See, e.g., Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, No. CIV 14-240-R, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75949 (W.D. Okla. June 24, 2014), modified sub nom. Catholic 
Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, No. 14-CV-685-R (W.D. Okla. July 1, 2014); Holland v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:13-cv-15487 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 2014). 
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injunctions have also been granted by district courts in numerous cases,193 
including in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell.194 
Thus, while the Supreme Court decided the issue of the contraceptive 
mandate for religious based closely held corporations, this issue is not going 
away, and will likely continue to develop as courts and the public wrestle 
with the nuances of the Court’s decision.195  In subsequent cases, it is 
suggested, that the focus should be on the religious beliefs, and not the tax 
status, of the corporations involved.196  While it is unlikely that publicly 
traded firms have a sincerely held religious belief, the RFRA focuses on 
religious beliefs, and tax status can change.197 
In Hobby Lobby, the challenge involved only four of the twenty 
contraceptive methods, not all FDA approved contraceptive methods.198  
While this may not be the broad sweep that Justice Ginsburg states, which 
could allow corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships, to opt out of 
“any law” except tax laws, the outcome could well expand in subsequent 
litigation.199  Justice Ginsburg further called the majority’s rulings 
“extraordinary religion-based exemptions” which could bring havoc.200  
Lower courts will have to rule on a case-by-case basis on the pending cases 
and future cases which may develop on the contraceptive mandate. 
 
 193. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-104(EGS) 
(D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2014); Midwest Fastener Corp. v. Burwell, No. 13-0337 (ESH),  
(D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2014); Johnson Welded Prods. v. Burwell, No. 13-00609 (ESH), 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151306   (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2014). 
 194. Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction, No. 12-6744 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 
2014). 
 195. Emily Pitt Mattingly, “Hobby-Lobby”-ing for Religious Freedom: Crafting the 
Religious Employer Exemption to the PPACA, 102 KY. L. J. 183, 201 (2013) (discussing 
the “nationwide dissatisfaction with the narrowness of the religious employer 
exemption”); see, e.g., Eternal World Television Network, Inc. v. Burwell, No. CIV.A. 
13-0521-CG-C, 2014 WL 2739347, at *3, *6 (S.D. Ala. June 17, 2014) (challenging the 
regulation that allows the plaintiff to opt out of providing contraception coverage by 
turning that responsibility to a third-party administrator because the act still facilitates 
access to contraception in violation of the company’s “sincere religious beliefs”). 
 196. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
 197. Ilya Somin, Can People “Exercise Religion” Through Publicly Traded 
Corporations?, WASH. POST (July 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/12/can-people-exercise-religion-through-publicly-
traded-corporations/; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)-(b) (2012); see also Business 
Structures, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/ 
Business-Structures (last updated Nov. 13, 2014). 
 198. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (majority opinion). 
 199. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 200. Id. 
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F. Lingering Questions in the Contraception Coverage Debate 
The regulation at issue in Burwell mandating that corporations with 
religious beliefs cover all methods of approved birth control should be 
explicitly altered to accommodate sincerely-held religious beliefs of closely-
held for profit corporations like Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga.  This 
would slow the race to the courthouse to get a preliminary or permanent 
injunction, and would clarify the issue for all.  Justice Kennedy’s suggestion 
in the concurrence that the insurance company should cover the types of 
birth control objected to by religious employers201 is inadequate, as 
employers are still paying for health insurance that covers these methods, 
whether directly or indirectly, and thus there would still be the religious 
objection that they could be complicit in providing an abortion, which they 
object to on the basis of their religion.202 
The long run effect on corporations who choose for religious purposes not 
to provide health insurance for the full range of contraceptives remains to be 
seen.  There could be employees who choose to work elsewhere, where 
these four methods are covered under insurance plans.  There could be other 
employees who share these values who choose to seek employment there.  
There could be customers who choose to shop elsewhere, while there could 
also be customers who seek out these stores because they share these values. 
However it should be noted that the decision is not as sweeping as it may 
appear, as, according to the Tenth Circuit, the contraceptive mandate does 
not apply to tens of millions of people,203 who are under grandfathered 
plans, exempt employers for religious reasons, or who work for companies 
with less than fifty employees.204  Furthermore, after the decision, HHS on 
July 16, 2014 in a letter to Guam exempted the U.S. territories of Guam, 
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern 
Mariana Islands, from some aspects of the ACA, at their request.205  The 4.5 
 
 201. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2785-87 (2014) (Kennedy, J. 
concurring). 
 202. See generally, Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Challenges: Religious Liberty and 
the HHS Mandate, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 1, 4-5 (2013). 
 203. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114, 1124, 1143 (10th Cir. 
2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  This 
number has been put much higher, as high as 190 million people not covered by the 
mandate.  Editorial, Hooray! The War on Women is Back: The Supreme Court Unleashes 
a Wave of Liberal Misinformation, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2014, at A12. 
 204. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124, 1143. 
 205. Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to 
Artemio B. Llagan, Comm’r of Guam Dep’t. of Revenue & Taxation (Jul. 16, 2014), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/letter-to-
llagan.pdf. 
24 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. 31:1 
million residents of these territories206 are exempt from certain aspects of the 
ACA, such as guaranteed availability and essential health benefits, which 
apply to “states” under the statute, but not exempted from other 
requirements such as the preventive health screenings at question in this 
case.207 
Thus, by deciding that employers in closely-held for profit corporations 
do not have to provide the four types of birth control that violate their 
religious beliefs, the court opened the door to further litigation.208  Perhaps a 
better solution is exempt these religious employers, for profit and not for 
profit, from the requirement to provide the contraceptives deemed 
objectionable on the basis of religion. 
III. KING V. BURWELL: LOOKING AHEAD TO THE NEXT ACA CASE 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
The litigation under the ACA on the contraceptive mandate and at least 
one other major issue continues at the time of this discussion.209  In 2014, 
two federal appellate courts issued contradictory opinions on whether the 
federal health insurance exchange qualifies as an exchange established by 
the State under the ACA, setting up this issue for a showdown in the 
Supreme Court.210  On November 7, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to 
hear King v. Burwell, an ACA case that involved the validity of an IRS 
regulation allowing for an individual tax credit for purchasing health 
insurance through a federally-established exchange.211 
 
 206. Editorial, Territories Free of ObamaCare: The White House Issues Another 
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 210. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 406, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g 
granted No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir.  Sept. 04, 2014); King, 
759 F.3d at 374-75. 
 211. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 364-65 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-
114, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 7428 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2014).  26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 states, in pertinent 
part, that a taxpayer whose household income is between 100% and 400% of the Federal 
poverty line is allowed a premium tax credit if the taxpayer is enrolled in a qualified 
health plan “through an Exchange.”  26 C.F.R. §§ 1.36B-2(a), (b)(1) (2013). 
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A. Individual Tax Credits 
The ACA states, “each State shall…establish an American Health Benefit 
Exchange.”212  A state may elect to establish an exchange, according to 
another section, and if a state does not so elect, the Secretary of HHS shall 
establish and operate an exchange within the state.213  A provision of the 
ACA allows for tax credits for those who purchase health insurance   
“through an Exchange established by the State.” 214  The IRS has interpreted 
this statutory provision broadly to also include individual in states that have 
a federal exchange, because the state chose not to establish an exchange.215 
B. Halbig v. Burwell 
On May 2, 2013, individual and corporate plaintiffs filed suit to prevent 
the implementation of the IRS’s rule related to tax credits.216  Without the 
rule extending the tax credit to federally-created exchanges, the individual 
plaintiffs would have been exempt from the individual mandate and excused 
from any fines for noncompliance because of their low incomes.217  Once 
the IRS applied the tax credit to individuals in the District of Columbia 
(including the plaintiffs), the total cost of the least expensive qualifying plan 
would be less than eight percent of each plaintiff’s income and, therefore, 
each plaintiff would be required to purchase an insurance plan or pay a tax 
penalty.218  Similarly, the corporate plaintiffs alleged that, while they 
currently were not required to provide health insurance to employees, any 
employee who was required to obtain coverage or pay a fine as a result of 
the tax credit would also trigger an obligation on plaintiffs’ part to provide 
similar plans for their employees.219  Collectively, the plaintiffs argued that 
the plain language of the statute required that only those exchanges created 
by the states, and not federally-created exchanges, would be subject to the 
tax credit scheme and asked the court to strike down the IRS rule.220  In 
short, plaintiffs in states with a federal exchange challenged the IRS rule 
 
 212. Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010); 
King, 759 F.3d at 364. 
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 215. 26 C.F.R. § 1-36B-2(a)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2014) (defining “Exchange”); 
King, 759 F.3d at 364. 
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 219. Id. at 6-7. 
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because they did not want to pay the penalty tax for not purchasing health 
insurance.221 
The District Court for the District of Columbia declined to do so.222  
Instead, the District Court granted the government’s motion for summary 
judgment because the language of the ACA unambiguously granted the IRS 
the authority to promulgate the rule.223  Specifically, the District Court held 
that, when viewed in the context of the ACA, the phrase “established by the 
State” includes both exchanges established by individual states and 
exchanges established by the federal government on behalf of states.224  The 
District Court further noted that other provisions in the ACA and the Act’s 
legislative history reflect Congress’ intent to make the tax credits available 
to taxpayers who were part of state-created and federally-created 
exchanges.225  Thus, the District Court held that Congress’ intent was clear 
and upheld the IRS rule under the first step of the Chevron statutory 
interpretation analysis.226 
On January 15, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Halbig 
v. Burwell reversed and vacated the IRS regulation since the ACA statute 
specifically states exchanges established by the State.227  Unlike the District 
Court, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the plain language of the statute 
precluded the IRS from extending the tax credit to purchasers in federally-
created exchanges.228  Specifically, the D.C. Circuit found the phrase 
“established by the State” controlling and held that the relevant portion of 
the statute “plainly distinguishes Exchanges established by states from those 
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established by the federal government.”229  The D.C. Circuit disagreed with 
the lower court’s determination that the legislative history supported the 
government’s reading, stating instead that the “scant legislative history” did 
not demonstrate Congress’ intent.230  The D.C. Circuit further reasoned that 
its decision was consistent with HHS’s exemptions of the five U.S. 
territories as not being “states” for purposes of aspects of the ACA.231 
Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the Department of Justice filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc, arguing that the “disruption threatened by the 
panel majority’s erroneous interpretation and the direct conflict with King 
present a question of ‘exceptional importance’ warranting en banc 
consideration.”232  On September 4, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit vacated its prior decision and granted rehearing en banc.233  Oral 
argument  was scheduled for December 17, 2014 but was removed from that 
calendar and the case held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s 
decision in King v. Burwell.234 
C. King v. Burwell 
Plaintiff David King was not eligible for health insurance coverage either 
through an employer or through the government, and his income exempted 
him from the penalty or tax for not having health insurance.235  His income 
qualified him for a subsidy through a state exchange, but Virginia is not one 
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of the states that set up an exchange.236  Mr. King did not want to procure 
health insurance and did not want to pay the penalty, but with the broadly 
written IRS rule that gives a subsidy for any “exchange,” he would either 
have to procure health insurance or pay the tax.237  Mr. King and other 
plaintiffs filed suit contending that the IRS rule exceeds the IRS’s regulatory 
authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.238 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the 
plaintiffs had standing to sue but dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.239  The 
District Court found that the IRS Rule carried out Congress’ clear intent to 
extend the tax credit to individuals who participated in federally-created 
exchanges.240  Construing the statute as a whole, the District Court reasoned 
that the tax credit provision should be read to apply to all exchanges because 
“it furthers Congress’s intent to provide affordable health insurance for 
all.”241  The District Court also looked to the trial court’s decision in Halbig 
v. Burwell and noted that “there is no evidence in the legislative record that 
[Congress] . . . ever entertained the idea of conditioning federal tax credits 
upon state participation.”242  In the alternative, the District Court also held, 
even if the statutory language was ambiguous as to Congress’ intent, that the 
IRS Rule is a reasonable interpretation of that provision of the ACA and, 
therefore, worth of deference from the courts.243 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in King v. Burwell244 held that 
the IRS regulation is a permissible exercise of agency discretion, affirming 
the district court.245  After affirming the holding that the parties have 
standing,246 the Court of Appeals turned to the merits.  Applying the two-
step test of administrative deference from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,247 the Court of Appeals found under the first 
step that Congress did not speak definitively to the question; the statue is 
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ambiguous and can be interpreted more than one way.248  The Court then 
applied the second prong of the test and considered whether the agency’s 
rule is based upon a permissible interpretation of the statute.249  Finding that 
the ACA permits the IRS rule to give tax credits for insurance purchased on 
the federal exchange,250 the Court of Appeals upheld the IRS rule as a 
permissible interpretation of the statute.251 
The Supreme Court is expected to make a decision on this case by the end 
of June 2015.252  If the Court limits the holding to the statutory language of 
exchanges run by the state, the Congress could amend the ACA section to 
state “exchanges” or “exchanges run by the state or federal government.”253  
When enacting the law, in hindsight, that distinction should have been made.  
The litigation continues under the Affordable Care Act, and is expected to 
continue as new issues emerge.254 
D. Predicting the Supreme Court’s Decision and Offering a Simple 
Legislative Fix 
Following the Supreme Court’s ACA decisions related to the individual 
mandate and contraception coverage, King v. Burwell addresses the tension 
between efforts to compel compliance with the individual mandate while 
simultaneously excusing larger entities such as states and corporations from 
complying with large swathes of the Act.  As noted by the court in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, the goals of the ACA could only be achieved with national 
compliance because a patchwork approach to health care reform would 
simply be ineffective.255  At the same time, Congress carved out exceptions 
for large employers and other key players in the insurance marketplace to 
help ensure that the ACA would pass.256  The Court in Hobby Lobby 
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articulated a broad exception to contraception coverage,257 potentially 
opening up the door for more religious-based ACA exemption claims.258    
King v. Burwell is the inevitable clash of those two ideas and a decision 
vacating the IRS Rule would lead to a curious result: individuals would be 
compelled to participate in federally-created exchanges without receiving 
the same benefits (here, a tax credit) that their counterparts in state-created 
exchanges receive as a statutory right. 
One must ask whether striking down the IRS rule would serve Congress’ 
ultimate goals in creating these exchanges and building this interlocking 
group of tax-based incentives.  The appellate courts in both King v. Burwell 
and Halbig v. Burwell seemed to have clear understanding of Congress’ 
intent in mandating individual participation.259 
Legal scholars and commentators agree that the case will have a 
significant impact on the ACA, regardless of the ruling.260  Some suggest 
that striking down the IRS regulations would effectively undermine the 
entire individual mandate261 while still others suggest that such a result 
would inevitably show that the ACA is “unworkable” without affirmative 
cooperation from the states.262  Some law professors have characterized the 
statutory language as a “drafting error” that the Court should be able to 
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correct.263  If the Supreme Court rejects the regulation, individuals in less 
than a third of the states will actually be eligible for the tax credit.264  For 
others who currently rely on that credit to make health insurance affordable, 
losing the credit may make the choice between maintaining now-expensive 
insurance and paying a lower fine a difficult choice to make.265 
The Court’s discussion in Sebelius yields some clues as to how the Court 
may approach the question.  There, the court recognized the ACA’s 
overarching policy goals and the importance of requiring full participation 
for the system to be effective.266  As many have noted,267 the Court was 
willing to look beyond the text of the statute that referred to a “penalty” to 
find instead that Congress assessed a tax.268  That approach seemed to ignore 
the plain language of the statute269 and Congress’ decision to characterize 
the payment as a penalty.270  Arguably, the Court reached that result based 
both on their understanding of the penalty within the overall ACA 
framework and the importance of the individual mandate to the law’s 
success.271  Similarly, the Court here could choose to cast aside the 
plaintiffs’ reading of the phrase “through an Exchange established by the 
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State”272 and instead rely on the framework of the ACA as a whole to 
determine that Congress only could have meant to extend the credit to all 
taxpayers, regardless of whether their exchange was created by a state or by 
the federal government for that state.273  Further, the District Court in both 
cases explicitly acknowledged that the credit is a cornerstone of the ACA 
and, like the individual mandate, the ACA is unlikely to survive in an 
effective form without it.274  Thus, looking back to the other tax-based ACA 
case taken up by the Supreme Court, there is reason to believe that the Court 
will read beyond any drafting issues to find a reasonable reading that shores 
up the health care exchange system. 
At the same time, the Court has willingly carved out broad exceptions in 
the ACA as it relates to contraceptive coverage and it may do the same here 
when confronted with the broader constitutional questions.  While the Court 
would do well to narrow its holding in Hobby Lobby,275 its analysis there 
may also illuminate how it will address the upcoming tax credit question.  
Notably, the Court declined to credit the suggestion made by the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals that the contraception coverage question be 
decided on the basis of taxation characteristics276 and instead addressed the 
broader constitutional claims.277  That decision may very well signal that, 
now that the Court has upheld the individual mandate, which is a key 
provision of the ACA, it is unwilling to advance further in service of the 
statute.278  At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that challenges 
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to a tax credit that would compel an otherwise exempt individual to purchase 
health insurance is not a divisive issue on par with contraception coverage.  
The justices who were willing to excuse religious corporations from 
providing contraception coverage may very well decline to intervene here. 
In the event that Congress is willing to take up the cause, the easiest way 
to avoid this would be to amend the relevant ACA section to apply to “all 
Exchanges” rather than an “Exchanges established by the State.”279  By 
pinning the tax credit section to a portion of the statute that explicitly 
addresses federally-created exchanges, Congress could remove the 
ambiguity from that portion of the statute.280  The current Congress, 
however, likely will not pass such an amendment while the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision still stands.281  Moreover, Congress is currently working to pass 
major legislation on topics unrelated to the ACA282 before the 114th 
Congress is sworn in this January.283  While the issue is of utmost 
importance to the ACA, there appears to be little desire to take up the sword 
for arguably the most controversial piece of legislation of President Obama’s 
administration.  Thus, challenges under this enormous federal statute and its 
implementing regulations are not abating any time soon. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Affordable Care Act ushered in sweeping changes in America’s 
health insurance and health care law.284  Litigation has ensued, reaching the 
Supreme Court twice at the time of this writing, with a third decision 
expected in 2015.285  While the Supreme Court clarified the issue for the 
parties in Burwell, litigation is expected to continue on that, and other issues, 
related to the Affordable Care Act.286 
While the Burwell decision clarified the issue of exemption from the 
contraceptive mandate for religious-based closely-held for-profit 
corporations such as Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties, 
the litigation continues on this issue, and other issues, such as the IRS rule 
allowing tax credits for health insurance purchased through “exchanges.”287 
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